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I
n the list of potential bioterrorist agents, influenza would
be classified as a category C agent (1). While previous
influenza pandemics were naturally occurring events, an
influenza pandemic could be started with an intentional
release of a deliberately altered influenza strain. Even if a
deliberately altered strain is not released, an influenza pan-
demic originating from natural origins will inevitably
occur (2) and will likely cause substantial illness, death,
social disruption, and widespread panic. Globally, the
1918 pandemic killed at least 20 million people (3). This
figure is approximately double the number killed on the
battlefields of Europe during World War I (4). In the
United States alone, the next pandemic could cause an esti-
mated 89,000–207,000 deaths, 314,000–734,000 hospital-
izations, 18–42 million outpatient visits, and 20–47 mil-
lion additional illnesses (5). These predictions equal or
surpass many published casualty estimates for a bioterror-
ism event (6–8). In addition to the potential for a large
number of casualties, a bioterrorism incident and an
influenza pandemic have similarities that allow public
health planners to simultaneously plan and prepare for
both types of emergencies (Table).
Preparing for both the next influenza pandemic and the
next bioterrorist attack requires support and collaboration
from multiple partners at the state, local, and federal level.
Potential partners include the medical community, law
enforcement, emergency management, and public health
agencies. To help foster these crucial cross-discipline rela-
tionships, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE), in collaboration with the
National Emergency Management Association, the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the
Association of Public Health Laboratories, hosted a 2-day
meeting on state and local pandemic influenza planning in
May 2002. Over 125 officials representing epidemiology,
communicable disease, laboratory, immunization, and
emergency management programs from 46 states regis-
tered for this meeting. The objectives of the meeting were
to enhance collaboration between state and local public
health and emergency management agencies, establish
mechanisms for integrating bioterrorism and pandemic
influenza preparedness and response planning, and deve-
lop policy and strategy options for influenza pandemic pre-
paredness and response at the state and local level. We
report the results of a questionnaire distributed to the atten-
dees; it was designed to elicit their views on the most
important issues that must be addressed by a plan to
respond to a catastrophic disease event.
Priorities for Pandemic Influenza Planning
All plans for any catastrophic infectious disease event
such as pandemic influenza or a bioterrorist attack must
address five topics: surveillance and laboratory issues;
communications; maintenance of community services;
medical care; and supply and delivery of vaccines and
drugs. After presentations providing background informa-
tion, conference attendees were divided into breakout
groups to discuss these topics. The groups did not discuss
particular scenarios, but the presentations given before the
breakout groups did include details of estimates of the
potential impact of the next influenza pandemic (5).
Attendees completed short (<5 questions), anonymous
questionnaires at both the beginning and end of the break-
out session. Each breakout group had a different set of
questions relevant to the topic of that group.
1 However, all
groups addressed a common question, which asked per-
sons to pick their top priority for a pandemic influenza
response from one of the following options: reduce mortal-
ity, reduce morbidity, ensure continuation of essential serv-
ices, reduce economic impact, and ensure equitable distri-
bution of resources. As explained to the attendees before
the breakout session, differences by age and risk group in
rates of mortality and morbidity could mean that public
health officials with limited resources might not be able to
simultaneously maximize reductions in mortality and mor-
bidity (5). The first three options were chosen most fre-
quently (Figure). Even after discussion, no option was cho-
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results are available from the corresponding author.sen by >50% of attendees, indicating that this group of
professionals did not have a unified opinion regarding
what the top priority should be to guide planning and
response measures.
Conference attendees did, however, agree that global
and domestic laboratory and disease surveillance must be
strengthened to increase the likelihood of early detection
and tracking of either pandemic influenza or a bioterrorist
event. A rise beyond the baseline number of influenza-like
illnesses (ILIs) could indicate a severe influenza season,
arrival of pandemic influenza, or early warning of a bioter-
rorist attack with a pathogen that causes ILIs (e.g.,
anthrax). Thus, the number and accuracy of reports of ILI,
ILI outbreaks, and laboratory-confirmed reports of
influenza need to be increased. In addition, ensuring that
adequate laboratory and disease surveillance systems are
in place will benefit the public health response during
yearly influenza epidemics. Conference attendees identi-
fied two critical gaps in infectious disease surveillance sys-
tems: 1) less than ideal or nonexistent systems to monitor
outpatient and hospital-based ILI cases and 2) insufficient
numbers of laboratory personnel and epidemiologists to
monitor, provide diagnostic support, and respond to
events.
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Table. Planning for pandemic influenza and bioterrorism: similarities and differences  
Issue  Bioterrorist event  Pandemic influenza 
Likelihood  High  High 
Warning  None to days  Days to months 
Occurrence  Focal or multifocal  Nationwide 
Transmission/duration of exposure  Point source; limited; person-to-person  Person-to-person, 6–8 wks 
Casualties  Hundreds to thousands  Hundreds of thousands to millions 
First responders susceptible?  Yes  Yes 
Disaster medical team support/response  Yes  No (too widespread) 
Main site for preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation  State and local areas  State and local areas 
Essential preparedness components 
Surveillance  Yes  Yes 
Law enforcement intelligence  Yes  No 
Investigation  Yes  Yes 
Research  Yes  Yes 
Liability programs  Yes  Yes 
Communication systems  Yes  Yes 
Medical triage and treatment plans  Yes  Yes 
Vaccine supply issues  Yes (for most likely threats)  Yes 
Drug supply issues  Yes  Yes 
Training/tabletop exercises  Yes  Yes 
Maintenance of essential community services  Yes  Yes 
Essential response components 
Rapid deployment teams  Yes  No 
Effective communications/media  relations strategy  Yes  Yes 
Vaccine delivery  Yes (for some)  Yes 
Drug delivery  Yes (for most)  Yes 
Hospital/public health  coordination  Yes  Yes 
Global assistance  Possibly  Yes 
Medical care  Yes  Yes 
Mental health support  Yes  Yes 
Mortuary services  Yes  Yes 
Supplies and equipment  Yes  Yes 
Essential mitigation components 
Enhanced surveillance  Yes  Yes 
Enhanced law enforcement intelligence  Yes  No 
Vaccine stockpile  Yes (selected agents)  Prototype vaccines only 
Drug stockpile  Yes  Yes 
Pre-event vaccination  Vaccination of selected groups
c  Vaccination of groups at medical high 
risk with pneumococcal vaccine
d 
aDuring a catastrophic infectious disease event, such as an influenza pandemic, there may be critical shortages of vaccines and drugs. Thus, clinics set up to administer 
vaccines and distribute antimicrobial drugs may require the services of a range of personnel whose fields of expertise are nonclinical. Examples of additional personnel 
that may be needed include law enforcement, translators, social workers, psychologists, and legal experts.  
bSource: Adapted from: National Vaccine Program Office. Pandemic influenza: a planning guide for state and local officials (Draft 2.1). Atlanta: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; 2000.  
cAt the time of writing, the smallpox vaccination program was just beginning. For other bioterrorist agents for which vaccines are available (e.g., anthrax), limited 
supplies and concerns about safety profiles have, up to this point, effectively prevented the widespread use of these vaccines. 
dIt may eventually be possible to vaccinate high-priority groups and the general population with a yet-to-be-developed “common epitope” vaccine, which might provide 
for a broader spectrum of protection against a variety of influenza A subtypes. Another critical component of any catastrophic infec-
tious disease plan is communications. The anthrax attacks
in 2001 demonstrated that the public, media, and health-
care professionals will demand accurate information, with
frequent updates throughout the emergency. To minimize
the potential for confusion, states and localities need to
identify a recognized and trusted leader who will be the
primary spokesperson to disseminate accurate information.
Among attendees in the communications breakout group,
40% felt that the state governor would be the best
spokesperson, 40% chose the state health officer, and 20%
chose the state epidemiologist. 
In the initial stages of, and potentially throughout, an
influenza pandemic or a bioterrorist attack, there will be a
shortage of many essential resources, including medical
equipment and supplies, personnel, vaccines, and drugs.
Prioritizing medical resources will therefore be necessary.
The medical care breakout group unanimously chose state
and local government as the authority that should prioritize
and distribute healthcare resources. In the breakout group
that discussed vaccine and antimicrobial agent issues, 73%
chose essential workers and physicians as those who
should be the first to receive vaccine and antiviral drugs.
Only 27% chose those at high risk for adverse influenza-
related health outcomes to be early recipients of vaccine.
Conclusions: Maximizing Resources 
and Planning Efforts
Conference attendees were well aware of the need to
simultaneously plan and prepare for the next influenza
pandemic and the next bioterrorist event. However, much
work remains to be done. Without agreement regarding the
top priority for allocating scarce resources, planning and
implementing an optimal response to either pandemic
influenza or a bioterrorist event will be difficult, if not
impossible. Illustrating potential planning problems was
the incongruity between the inability of most attendees to
agree on the goal of planning and response measures
(Figure) while 75% of a subgroup stated that essential
workers and physicians should be the first to receive vac-
cines and antiviral drugs. In a situation with limited
resources, usually only one goal can be optimized (either
maximized or minimized) (9). Therefore, before accepting
any of the initially limited supplies of vaccine and antivi-
ral drugs, physicians and first responders will have to
explain how such an allocation will help achieve the cho-
sen top priority. 
Unprecedented resources for enhancing the public
health preparedness and response infrastructure have been
recently provided to all states by congressional appropria-
tions in the form of bioterrorism cooperative agreements.
The request for proposals stated that planning moneys may
be used “…to upgrade state and local public health juris-
dictions’ preparedness for and response to bioterrorism,
other outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public
health threats and emergencies…” (10). Using such
resources and reflecting upon the lessons learned from pre-
vious influenza pandemics and the 2001 terrorist events,
public health, medical, and emergency management com-
munities must work together to develop an effective plan
to strengthen our national readiness to respond to any cat-
astrophic infectious disease situation.
If our public health planning efforts are too narrowly
focused on preparing responses to a few select bioterror-
ism-related scenarios, a new opportunity for planning
responses to a broad spectrum of infectious disease-related
catastrophes will be lost. Any plans made for responding to
either pandemic influenza or bioterrorism events must
include an explicit mechanism for making difficult deci-
sions regarding the prioritization of scarce resources. The
conference highlighted the need for all states to continue
their discussions and public debates regarding the setting
of priorities and methods for allocating scarce resources.
Obviously, each state or local government will chose its
own specific method for drawing up a plan to deal with
catastrophic infectious disease events such as an influenza
pandemic. To help aid the planning process, materials such
as a planning guide are available from agencies such as
CDC and CSTE. Ideally, such planning and prioritization
activities should take place well in advance of any cata-
strophic infectious disease event.
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Figure. Distribution of responses identifying which goal should be
the top priority for pandemic influenza planning and response (n =
107). During the conference, attendees were split into five groups
for a breakout session. At the beginning and end of each such ses-
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group had the same first question, in which attendees were asked
to choose one of five options for top priority for influenza pandem-
ic planning. This figure shows the frequency distribution of the
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